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Prisoner Access To Psychosurgery:
A Constitutional Perspective

With the development of an increasingly sophisticated medical technology, the possibility that the state may intervene in an individual's personality
and thereby control his behavior has become a reality.I As evinced in such
2
landmarks of modem literature as Anthony Burgess' A Clockwork Orange

and Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest,3'there is much concern
that sophisticated behavioral techniques could be employed on unwilling
prisoners and mental patients. Courts and legislators are aware of the
peculiar vulnerability of the prisoner and the mental patient and have taken
steps guaranteeing the prisoner and the mental patient certain rights.4 In
particular, legislators have sought to eliminate the employment of treatment
modalities that attempt to control behavior on unconsenting prisoners and
mental patients. In California, the legislature has enacted statutes5 guaranteeing prisoners 6 and mental patients 7 the right to refuse treatment modalities,
1. See Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies to "Treat?", "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" PrisonersAnd Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616, 616 (1972).
2. A. BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962).
3. K. KEsEY, ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (1961).
4. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d
451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972); Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535
(1976).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§2670-2680 and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5325-5328.9.

6.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§2670:

It is hereby recognized and declared that all persons, including all persons involuntarily confined, have a fundamental right against enforced interference with their
thought processes, states of mind, and patterns of mentation through the use of
organic therapies; that this fundamental right requires that no person with the capacity for informed consent who refuses organic therapy shall be compelled to undergo
such therapy; and that in order to justify the use of organic therapy upon a person
who lacks the capacity for informed consent, other than psychosurgery as referred to
in subdivision (c) of Section 2670.5 which is not to be administered to such persons,
the state shall establish that the organic therapy would be beneficial to the person,
that there is a compelling interest in administering such therapy, and that there are no
less onerous alternatives to such therapy.
7. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5325:
Each person involuntarily detained for evaluation or treatment under provisions of
this part, each person admitted as a voluntary patient to any facility as defined in
Section 1250 of the Health and Safety Code in which psychiatric evaluation or
treatment is offered, and each mentally retarded person committed to a state hospital
pursuant to Article 5 (commencing with Section 6500), Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division
6 shall have the following rights, a list of which shall be prominently posted in English
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specifically organic therapies, 8 which are employed to control human be-

havior. This legislation effectively preserves the autonomy of the prisoner
and mental patient to refuse procedures that can have drastic and potentially
dangerous effects on human behavior.
The statute guaranteeing prisoners a right to refuse organic therapies,
however, falls short of being a comprehensive regulation of organic
therapies by its failure to address those situations in which a prisoner, of his
own initiative and with full knowledge of the risks involved, seeks access to
organic therapy. 9 This comment will examine criteria that should be implemented in determining whether to grant a prisoner access to one type of
organic therapy-psychosurgery.' 0 At the outset, consideration will be
given to California Penal Code Sections 2670-2680 which regulate the
state's ability to impose psychosurgery and other forms of organic therapy
on prisoners. Attention will next be focused on two cases, Kaimowitz v.
Departmentof Mental Health." and Aden v. Younger,' 2 which address the
and Spanish in all facilities providing such services and otherwise brought to his
attention by such additional means as the Director of Health may designate by
regulation:
(a) To wear his own clothes; to keep and use his own personal possessions including
his toilet articles; and to keep and be allowed to spend a reasonable sum of his own
money for canteen expenses and small purchases.
(b) To have access to individual storage space for his private use.
(c) To see visitors each day.
(d) To have reasonable access to telephones, both to make and receive confidential
calls.
(e) To have ready access to letter writing materials, including stamps, and to mail
and receive unopened correspondence.
(f) To refuse convulsive treatment including, but not limited to, any electroconvulsive treatment, any treatment of the mental condition which depends on the induction
of a convulsion by any means, and insulin coma treatment.
(g) To refuse psychosurgery. Psychosurgery is defined as those operations currently referred to as lobotomy, psychiatric surgery, and behavioral surgery and all other
forms of brain surgery if the surgery is performed for the purpose of the following:
(1) Modification or control of thoughts, feelings, actions, or behavior rather than
the treatment of a known and diagnosed physical disease of the brain;
(2) Modification of normal brain function or normal brain tissue in order to control
thoughts, feelings, action, or behavior; or
(3) Treatment of abnormal brain function or abnormal brain tissue in order to
modify thoughts, feelings, actions or behavior when the abnormality is not an
established cause for those thoughts, feelings, action, or behavior.
Psychosurgery does not include prefrontal sonic treatment wherein there is no
destruction of brain tissue. The Director of Health shall promulqate appropriate
regulations to assure adequate protection of patients' rights in such treatment.
(h) Other rights, as specified by regulation.
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE §2670.5(c):

The term organic therapy refers to:
(1) Psychosurgery, including lobotomy, stereotactic surgery, electronic, chemical
or other destruction of brain tissues, or implantation of electrodes into brain tissue.
(2) Shock therapy, including but not limited to any convulsive therapy and insulin
shock treatments.
(3) The use of any drugs, electric shocks, electronic stimulation of the brain, or
infliction of physical pain when used as an aversive or reinforcing stimulus in a
program of aversive, classical, or operant conditioning.
9. See Shapiro, Legislatingthe Control of Behavior Control:Autonomy and the Coercive
Use of OrganicTherapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237,324-25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro].
10. See Note 16, infra.
11. Kaimowitz v. Dep't of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
County, Mich., July 10, 1973). This case is unreported and all references herein will be to the
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question of prisoner and mental patient access to psychosurgery. Using the
aforementioned statute and cases as a framework, the comment will center
on relevant constitutional issues raised by the question of prisoner access to
psychosurgery. Issues to be discussed include whether mentation 3 is protected by the first amendment guarantee of free speech and the right of
privacy. Additional consideration will be given to whether the right of
privacy protects the prisoner's decision, as manifest by informed consent, to
undergo psychosurgery. Finally, the discussion will conclude with an analysis of whether a prisoner's right to equal protection is violated by attempts to
limit prisoner and mental patient access to psychosurgery while allowing the
public unfettered access to such procedures. Through this analysis, it will be
determined whether a prisoner has a right of access to psychosurgery.
As will become evident, there is much repetition among the concepts
involved. Throughout the discussion, therefore, it should be kept in mind
that Penal Code Sections 2670-2680 represent California's statutory scheme
to prevent enforced interference with a prisoner's mentation; Kaimowitz
represents one state's judicial review of prisoner access to psychosurgery;
and Aden represents California's judicial review of the mental patient's
right of access to psychosurgery. Though none are directly on point, all are
instructive of the rights and legal considerations involved. That the same
rights and considerations reappear in each instance is especially indicative of
their relevance.
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: RECENT LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL REACTION TO PSYCHOSURGERY

The question of prisoner access to psychosurgery became a matter of
14
public attention during the summer of 1976 when Edmumd Kemper, a
prisoner at the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, petitioned the
Superior Court of Solano County for permission to undergo stereotactic
neurosurgery, a sophisticated form of psychosurgery. Kemper's original
petition was denied by the Superior Court with the understanding that if he
could demonstrate he has a right to psychosurgery, his request would be
given further consideration.1 5 Subsequently, Kemper filed an application for
psychosurgery which application was denied by the Superior Court on the
basis that no showing had been made that psychosurgery would benefit the
slip opinion. The opinion is also reprinted in part in State Court Bars Experimental Brain
Surgery, 2 PRISON L. REP. 433 (1973).
12. 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976).
13. Mentation is defined as mental activity. MERRIAM-WEBSTER NEW INTERNATIONAL

(3d ed. 1976).
14. See generally M. CHENEY, THE COED KILLER (1976).
15. Order Assigning Public Defender, In re Organic Therapy for Edmund Emil Kemper
III (No. 11422, Solano County Superior Court, Cal., June 3, 1976).

DICTIONARY
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recipient. 6 In order to understand the rationale of this denial, attention must
be given to the nature and past uses of psychosurgery.
Psychosurgery, statutorily designated a form of organic therapy, 17 is
simplisticly understood as a means of altering, hopefully improving, a
person's behavior by performing surgery on a portion of the brain.'" Over
the years, the procedures employed in psychosurgery have advanced from
the cruder forms of frontal lobotomy to what one commentator sees as the
electronic age of psychosurgery.' 9 The advocates of psychosurgery claim
that through the use of an increasingly sophisticated technology, both the
specificity and reliability of psychosurgery have been improved.20 The
developers of these more sophisticated techniques believe that it is now
possible to selectively alter specific personality traits 21 without the general
22
dampening of emotions which often accompanied the frontal lobotomy.
The optimism of the proponents of psychosurgery is not universally
maintained. Opponents of psychosurgery voice many concerns including the
fear that sufficient technology has not been attained to allow the procedure
to be categorized as therapeutic. 23 Other opponents find psychosurgery itself
abhorrent on ethical, spiritual, or political grounds. 24 The concern of the
opponents of psychosurgery, particularly those whose reservations are based
on a claim of insufficient technological expertise, is that psychosurgery has
irreversible effects, but no proven therapeutic value. 25 An additional objection to the use of psychosurgery is the substantial danger it poses to human
16. Order, In re Application of Edmund E. Kemper for writ of Habeus Corpus (No.
11422, Solano County Superior Court, Cal., August 31, 1977).
17. See note 8 supra.
18. See Chorover, Psychosurgery: A Neuropsychological Perspective, 54 B.U.L. REV.
231, 231 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Chorover].

[Pisychosurgery may be defined as brain surgery that has as its primary purpose the
alteration of thoughts, social behavior patterns, personality characteristics, emotional reactions, or some similar aspects of subjective experience in human beings. In the
broadest sense, psychosurgery is predicated upon the undeniable existence of a

relationship between brain and mind. Its proponents, however, make the more
specific claim that with respect to certain forms of mental illness, behavior disorder,
or emotional disturbance, significant therapeutic results may be obtained following
the surgical destruction of particular brain regions.
19. Id. at 234-35. Chorover explains lobotomy as the technological conclusion to the

premise that mental functions are localized in the brain. Lobotomy is a technique by which the
frontal lobes of the brain are isolated and in effect destroyed. This was initially achieved by
alcohol injections which coagulated the fibers comprising the perimeters of the frontal lobe and
later by use of a special knife, the leucotome, to sever these fibers.

Lobotomy, as a psychosurgical procedure, was found to be inadequte because it permitted
access only to the superficial portions of the brain such as the frontal lobe. In an effort to reach
areas of the brain inaccessible by manual procedures, stereotactic techniques permit the
surgeon to pinpoint areas of suspected brain dysfunction. The surgeon would then drill a small
hole in the skull of the patient and under precise mechanical control, direct probes, electrodes
or chemicals toward the target of brain dysfunction without demolishing the external portions
of the brain. Id. at 232-39.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 235.
23. Annas & Glantz, Psychosurgery: The Law's Response, 54 B.U.L. REv. 249, 249
(1974).

24. Id.
25. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 247.
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freedom when, in a custodial situation, it is used in a punitive rather than a
rehabilitative or therapeutic manner. 26 Thus, opponents of the use of
psychosurgery find both the techniques employed and the motive behind its
employment suspect.
The history of psychosurgery's use in the California prison system is
neither consistent nor laudable. Perhaps the most publicized use of
psychosurgery in California was upon three inmates in 1968 as a treatment
for epilepsy. 27 There is some doubt whether adequate consent was obtained
from the inmates for these procedures. 28 Several years later, the California
Department of Corrections again demonstrated its willingness to employ
psychosurgery by making a request for the funding of a program designed to
evalute and treat violent inmates by surgical and diagnostic procedures
involving the brain. 29 Public disclosure of this request created a great deal of
controversy and eventually, the request was rejected.3 0 At present, the
California Department-of Corrections maintains a strict policy prohibiting
the use of psychosurgery in institutions under its direction.3 1 It must be
questioned, however, whether the state may properly deny a requesting
prisoner access to psychosurgery in light of the possible infringement of
constitutional rights. 32 Discussion will begin with a brief analysis of the
33
California Penal Code Sections restricting the use of psychosurgery.
A.

CaliforniaPenal Code Section 2670

In 1976 the California Legislature adopted exacting restrictions on the use
of organic therapy within the penal system by the addition of California
Penal Code Sections 2670-2680. 34 This legislation deals exclusively with
the use of "organic therapy" within the penal system. 35 By statutory
definition, organic therapy includes psychosurgery, shock therapy and cer26. Shapiro, supra note 9 at 244-45 n.10; J. MITFORD, KIND AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

(1973) [hereinafter cited as J. MITFORD] in which it is stated that:
[P]sychiatry in the prison consists primarily in therapeutic practices which can have
punitive or disciplinary implications, electric shock, insulin shock, fever treatment,

hydrotherapy, Amytal and Pentothal interviews, spinals, and cisternals [insertion of

needle into spinal cord] and so on-that is, everything except psychotherapy.
27. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 247 n.16; Note, Medicaland PsychologicalExperimentation on CaliforniaPrisoners.7 U. Cal. D.L. Rev. 351, 363 (1974).
28. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 247 n.16.
29. J. MITFORD, supra note 26, at 128-29; Shapiro, supra note 9, at 248 n.23.
30. J. MrrFORD, supra note 26, at 129.
31. 15 CAL. ADM. CODE §3343:
Psychosurgery, including lobotomy, stereotactic surgery, electronic, chemical or
other destruction of brain tissue, or imolantation of electrodes into brain tissue, is not
and will not be performed on persons committed to or in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
32. See text accompanying notes 78-110 (first amendment), 111-164 (privacy), 164-203
(equal protection) infra.
33. It should be noted that there is a possible conflict between California Penal Code
Section 2670 and Title 15, Section 3343 of the California Administrative Code. The Penal Code
states only that the prisoner has the same right as an ordinary citizen insofar as refusing to
undergo psychosurgery. By implication, this statute permits psychosurgery when consented to.
Because the Administrative Code prohibits psychosurgery within the prison system under all
circumstances, an inconsistency is apparent.
34. CAL. PENAL CODE §§2670-2680, CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1513, §1, at 3325.
35. See note 8 supra.
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tain forms of aversive and, reinforcing stimuli used in conditioning programs.36 The purpose of this statute, as suggested by one commentator, is:
[Ti insure that rigorous restraints are placed on any state efforts
toward mental "demolition" masquerading as "therapy" . . .
without jeopardizing the plainly admirable goals of curing or arresting severe mental illness-and thereby achieving some measure of benefit to the victim/patient/prisoner, and some measure of
public protection and benefit. ...
These concerns are also reflected in the statute's declaration of policy which
states:
It is hereby recognized and declared that all persons including
all persons involuntarily confined have a fundamental right
against enforced interference with their thought processes, states
of mind, and powers of mentation through the use of organic
therapies; that this fundamental right requires that no person with
the capacity for informed consent who refuses
organic therapy
38
shall be compelled to undergo such therapy.
From the declaration of policy found in the statute and the aforementioned
•history of psychosurgery in California penal institutions, several facts may
be drawn. The most salient fact drawn from the codifications of Penal Code
Sections 2670 to 2680 is that a prisoner has a statutorily recognized interest in
39
his own "thought processes, states of mind and powers of mentation."
The statute affords protection to these interests by permitting the use of
organic therapies upon a competent prisoner 4° only after having obtained his
informed consent.4" Even so, when organic therapies other than
psychosurgery are in question, the state will be able in certain narrow
instances to override the choice of the prisoner not to undergo the procedure
by demonstrating a compelling interest that will be served by having the
prisoner undergo the procedure. 42 In the case of psychosurgery, however,
36.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§2670.5.

37. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 249 (emphasis added).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670 (emphasis added).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670.

40. Hereinafter, a "competent prisoner" will be used to denote one capable of giving
legally adequate informed consent. For a discussion of informed consent, see text accompanying notes 136158 infra.
41. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670.5; CAL. PENAL CODE §2672:
(a) For purposes of this article, "informed consent" means that a person must
knowingly and intelligently, without duress or coercion, and clearly and explicitly
manifest his consent to the proposed organic therapy to the attending physician.
(b) A person confined shall not be deemed incapable of informed consent solely
by virtue of being diagnosed 4s a mentally ill, disordered, abnormal or mentally
defective person.
42. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670 provides in pertinent part that:

[I]n order to justify the use of organic therapy upon a person who lacks the capacity
for informed consent. . . the state shall establish that the organic therapy would be
beneficial to the person, that there is a compelling interest in administering such
therapy, and that there are no less onerous alternatives to such therapy.
See also, CAL. PENAL CODE §2671, which provides for the use of shock therapy upon an
unconsenting prisoner in emergency situations.
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the statute specifies that all prisoners, competent or not, have an absolute
right to refuse to undergo the procedure. 43 The fact that the statute grants to
the prisoner an absolute right to refuse to undergo psychosurgery and a
qualified right to refuse to undergo other forms of organic therapy demonstrates the state's high regard for the prisoner's autonomous choice in the
giving or withholding of consent to these treatments.
A second fact drawn from the declaration of policy is the recognition that
mentation involves a "fundamental right" 44 thus necessitating a "compelling interest" '4 5 and a showing of no "least onerous alternatives" before the
state may interfere with a prisoner's mentation by forcing organic therapy
upon an unwilling or incompetent prisoner. The use of the "compelling
interest" and "least onerous alternative"46 language is important insofar as
it indicates the test to be employed in determining when an interference with
mentation will be warranted. While the statute makes this test inapplicable
to the state's ability to impose psychosurgery upon a prisoner, 47 the fact that
psychosurgery affects mentation may allow this test to be employed in
determining whether the state may deny a prisoner access to psychosurgery.
This language is of further import in that it echoes the considerations
48
evaluated in equal protection cases.
In general, the declaration of policy contained in Penal Code Section
2670 demonstrates a strong belief that the fundamental right of mentation is
retained by the prisoner to largely the same extent .it is held by those not
subject to criminal confinement. 49 The statute is not a grant of a right to the
prisoner; more accurately, it is an expression of a right not lost as an
incident of confinement. The expression of this right may be seen as an
extension of the policy regarding prisoner's rights set forth, in California
Penal Code Section 2600. This section declares that a prisoner, as a result of
his status as a prisoner, forfeits only those rights necessary to provide
security of the institution and protection of the public. 50 In the face of the
declaration of policy found in Section 2670, the use of psychosurgery upon
an unwilling or incompetent prisoner is clearly beyond the scope of power
necessary to protect the public or to insure the security of the penal institution.
43. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670 provides that a competent prisoner has an absolute right to
refuse to undergo any form of organic therapy. In the case of the incompetent prisoner, the
state may impose organic therapy, other than psychosurgery, only upon a showing that organic
therapy would benefit the prisoner and would serve a compelling interest. In no situation,
however, may the state impose psychosurgery on an incompetent or unconsenting prisoner.
44. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670.
46. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670.

47. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670.
48. See text accompanying notes 166-171 infra.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670 provides: "It is hereby recognized and declared that all

persons, including all persons involuntarily confined, have a fundamental right. . . against
organic therapy .... " (emphasis added).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE §2600; CAL. PENAL CODE §2601 provides for the retention of rights
within the ambit of the first amendment.
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The basic shortcoming of Section 2670, however, is its failure to address
the situation in which the prisoner of his own initiative seeks access to
psychosurgery. This statute was prompted by situations in which the state
sought to impose organic therapy upon a prisoner. Edmund Kemper's
petition presents a somewhat different problem in that the prisoner, independent of any state encouragement, seeks access to such therapy. The Solano
County Superior Court, while dismissing the petition, made note of the
legislature's silence on the matter, remarking that, "it does not appear that
the legislature thus far has provided for the initiation of [such] proceedings
51
...
by an individual prisoner.
While the statute, on its face, appears inapplicable to a prisoner's request
for access to psychosurgery, the considerations underlying the statute may
be useful in determining whether the prisoner has a right of access. As
previously stated, these considerations include the protection of the prisoner's right of mentation, his right to control interferences with mentation by
exercising informed consent, and the prisoner's retention of rights except as
necessary for prison security and public protection. It is noteworthy that the
principal decision dealing with a prisoner's right of access to psychosurgery,
Kaimowitz v. Departmentof Mental Health,52 was based on considerations
similar to those found in the California statute.
B.

The Kaimowitz Decision

The Kaimowitz case involved a prisoner, Doe, who had been committed
under the Michigan Criminal Sexual Psychopath statute. 53 While he was
confined, the Department of Mental Health approved an experimental program in which prisoners would be used as subjects in scientific tests. The
program's purpose was to explore the control of violence through the
application of various treatments, including psychosurgery. Doe was selected as a subject for the experiment and the consent of both Doe and his
parents was obtained. Prior to implementation of psychosurgery, Doe was
released when it was found that the statute under which he had been
convicted was unconstitutional. This suit was initiated by Kaimowitz, a
Michigan attorney, who claimed that the experimental use of psychosurgery
was against the public policy of the State of Michigan. The Superior Court
of Wayne County, seeing the potential for a similar case to arise in the
54
future, elected to hear the case rather than to declare it moot.
In deciding the case, the Michigan court relied heavily on the concept of
informed consent. The court employed the concept of the inviolability of the
51. Order Assigning Public Defender, In re Organic Therapy for Edmund Emil Kemper
IlI(No. 11422, Solano County Superior Court, Cal., June 3, 1976).
52. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
53. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §780.501 (repealed by 1968 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 143, §2).

54. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich. at 1-7.
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person and stated that any intrusion upon this inviolability is warranted only
by the individual's informed consent. 55 The court went on to state that the
adequacy of one's informed consent was based upon the consent being
competent, knowing and voluntary.5 6 The court held that consent is a
concept of variable demands 57 and as applied to a prisoner seeking experi58
mental psychosurgery, consent could not, as a matter of law, be adequate.
While the Kaimowitz decision is based upon the informed consent requirement, the court also mentions by way of dicta that, due to the possible
adverse effects of psychosurgery upon mentation, certain constitutional
rights of a prisoner may also be endangered. The court recognized that
mentation may be protected as a right to generate ideas under the first
amendment5 9 and by a right of privacy. 6°
The Kaimowitz decision is distinguishable from the situation presented by
Kemper's request for psychosurgery. The most prominent distinction is that
the Kaimowitz decision was based upon a procedure that was specifically
part of an experimental program. The procedure to which Kemper seeks
access is clearly not a part of an experimental program, and therefore, the
which the Kaimowitz decision is based, is not entirely
rationale upon
61
apposite.
The Kaimowitz decision is important for its discernment of issues similar
to those articulated in California Penal Code Section 2670. Both place
emphasis on the need for the informed consent of the prisoner before
psychosurgery may be employed. In addition, both recognize that there is a
significant interest in mentation which may be affected by psychosurgery.
C. The Aden Decision
While neither the California Penal Code nor the Kaimowitz court address
the issue of a prisoner's right of access to non-experimental psychosurgery,
a recent California decision did touch upon a mental patient's right of access
to such therapy. In the case of Aden v. Younger, 62 the court ruled upon the
constitutionality of sections of the California Welfare and Institutions Code
concerning a patient's right to refuse electroshock therapy and
psychosurgery, and the circumstances under which a patient would be
allowed to undergo such procedures. 63 The court stated that the procedures
in question, as with any other medical procedures, were properly the subject
55. Id. at 18.
56. Id. at 22.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 31.

59. Id. at 32-36.
60. Id. at 36-39.

61. See text accompanying notes 151-153, infra.
62. 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976).
63. Id. This case was brought by two mental patients and their physicians in order to test
the constitutionality of CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5325, 5326, 5326.3, 5326.4. One patient
sought further electroshock treatment, while the other sought psychosurgery.
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of state regulation. 6 Moreover, due to the varying levels of acceptance for
these treatments within the medical community, and the varying effects
these treatments have upon the patient, this state-imposed regulation could
65
take -different forms and go to different extents.
The court stated that some regulation of these procedures was proper
because of their drastic effects upon the patient.6 6 Further, the court said that
the state had a valid interest in regulating psychosurgery and electroshock
therapy in order to protect the patient from "unwarranted, unreasonable and
unconsented-to invasions of body and mind. "67
While recognizing the state's interest in regulating the patient's decision
to undergo psychosurgery and electroshock therapy, the court also stated
that regulating the patient's access to such procedures has a significant effect
upon the patient's rights. Among the patient's rights affected by regulating
access to psychosurgery and electroshock therapy are rights of privacy and
speech.68 Concerning the possibility that such regulation would infringe
upon the patient's freedom of speech, the court stated that speech and
thought are so intimately related that any regulation that curtailed freedom
69
of thought had the necessary consequence of limiting freedom of speech.
In light of the fact that freedom of thought and thereby freedom of speech
may be lost through such regulation, the court required that the state
70
demonstrate a compelling interest in such regulation.
As noted, the court also expressed concern that the patient's right of
privacy may be invaded by these regulations. With regard to the right of
privacy, the court appeared to be concerned with affording protection in two
areas. The first area was the preservation of the patient's right of privacy by
protecting the inviolability of the patient's mind. 71 In the second area, the
court questioned whether the state, by substituting its judgment for that of
the patient by means of a substantive review of the patient's decision to
64. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 678, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
65. Id.

66. Id. at 674, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
67. Id. at 678, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46.
68. Id. at 678, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546: "Arrayed against these legitimate state interests are
equally valid considerations of rights of privacy, freedom of speech and thought, and the right
to medical treatment."
69. Id.70. Id. at 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546:
The right to be free in the exercise of one's own thoughts is essential to the exercise

of other constitutionally guaranteed rights. First Amendment rights of free speech
would mean little if the state were to control thought. . . .Here the state has sought
to control neither what is thought by mental patients, nor how they think. Rather, the
state is attempting to regulate the use of procedures which touch upon thought

processes in significant ways, with neither the intention nor the effect of regulating
thought processes, per se. Yet despite the lack of any showing the state has attempt-

ed to regulate freedom of thought, this legislation may diminish this right. If so, the
legislation can only be sustained by showing (1)
it is necessary to further a "compelling state interest" and (2) the least drastic means has been employed to further those

interests.
71. Id. at 678, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46. See text accompanying notes 111-118 infra.
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undergo an organic therapy, effected an invasion of the patient's privacy
rights .72
The Aden decision, while pertinent to the issue of a mental patient's right
of access to psychosurgery, is not directly applicable to the question of a
prisoner's access to psychosurgery. The case, however, remains instructive
on the question of prisoner access to psychosurgery in its recognition that
denial of such access may also represent a loss of constitutional rights.
Implicit in the Aden decision is judicial recognition of a constitutional
presumption in favor of personal autonomy 73 that may only be overcome if
the state demonstrates that the regulation serves a compelling interest.
As previously noted, neither Penal Code Section 2670, the Kaimowitz
decision, nor the Aden decision may be relied upon to resolve the question
of a prisoner's right of access to psychosurgery. These authorities are
useful, however, in pointing out which interests of the prisoner are to be
protected. The first interest to be protected, as seen in both Penal Code
Section 2670 and the Kaimowitz decision, is the prisoner's right of mentation.74 As demonstrated by the Aden decision, however, psychosurgery
should not be considered solely on the basis of the possible adverse effects
of psychosurgery. Consideration should also be given to the possibility that
insofar as psychosurgery may be therapeutic, denial of access to it may
75
effect a denial of a right to mentation.
In both Penal Code Section 2670 and the Kaimowitz decision, the use of
informed consent was deemed essential to safeguarding the interests of the
prisoner. 76 Particularly in the Kaimowitz decision, the quality of consent
was explored in recognition of the drastic procedures that were in question.
Also of note is that in both Penal Code Section 2670 and the Aden decision,
the standard that must be met before the state will be permitted to substitute
its judgment for that of the patient/prisoner is the demonstration of a
77
compelling interest.
The remaining portions of this comment will explore the relevant constitutional issues raised by the question of prisoner access to psychosurgery.
In particular, attention will be directed toward the effect that a denial of
access would have upon first amendment and privacy rights. Consideration
will also be given to whether equal protection is violated by limiting the
regulation of access to psychosurgery to prisoners.
72. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 683, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548:
The substantive review of proposed treatments for competent and voluntary patients
is a different problem. Once the competency of the patient and voluntariness of the

consent is confirmed, what interest of the state can justify the substitution of the
review committee's decision for that of the patient and his physician?
See text accompanying notes 119-130 infra.
73. See note 135 infra.

74. See text accompanying notes 34-61 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 61-73 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 34-61 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 61-73 supra.
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MENTATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech is not limited in
application to speech itself. As set forth in Justice Brandeis' concurring
opinion in Whitney v. California,"8 the theory underlying a broad application of first amendment protection is that:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties...
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
79
political truth.
It would seem then, that the first amendment would protect not only speech
itself but also the sum of thought processes that are necessarily antecedent to
communication. This notion finds support in the case of Stanley v. Georgia," wherein the United States Supreme Court held unconsitutional a
81
Georgia statute that made mere possession of obscene material a crime.
The Court maintained that the very concept of the first amendment protected
the reception of ideas and any attempt to regulate the mere reception of ideas
is repugnant to the first amendment. 8 2 The Stanley Court found regulation
of the reception of ideas impermissible because of the potential that such
regulation would be used by the state to implement mind control. 8 3 The
essence of the Court's decision is that in order for the first amendment to
provide meaningful protection of speech, it must also protect mentation, the
antecedent of speech.'
That mentation is a protectable interest under the first amendment is
consonant with both the Kaitnowitz and Aden decisions as well as with
California Penal Code Section 2670. In dicta, the Kaimowitz court stated
that its decision denying the implementation of psychosurgery on an involuntarily confined person is in accord with the mandate of the first
amendment which recognizes that "[g]overnment has no power or right to
control men's minds, thoughts and expressions.' 84 The Aden court is even
more explicit in its statement that, "First Amendment rights of free speech
would mean little if the state were to control thought.'85 California Penal
Code Section 2670, while not specifying a right derived from the first
amendment, recognizes a "fundamental right against enforced interference
with [prisoners'] thought processes, states of mind and patterns of mentation. "86 In terms of a prisoner's right of access to psychosurgery, each of
78. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 568.
Id. at 564.

83. Id. at 565.

84. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.) at 35.
85. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
86. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670.
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these examples is pertinent insofar as they recognize that psychosurgery has
an effect upon mentative capacity, and that because of this effect, regulation
of the use of the procedure is subject to scrutiny under the first amendment.
It has been argued that while implementation of psychosurgery upon an
unconsenting prisoner would violate the prisoner's first amendment right,
denial of access to psychosurgery to a consenting prisoner may also violate
this right.8 7 Fundamental to this argument is the aforementioned proposition
that the first amendment protects not only speech, but also the necessary
antecedent of speech, mentation.58 Mentation that is actually involved in
speech, however, is not susceptible to prior discernment. That is, though
only a portion of one's thought processes are teleologically related to
communication, there are no means of discerning those portions that are
from those that are not. Therefore, in order to protect speech, protection
must be afforded all mentation s9 With regard to the effect of psychosurgery
upon mentation, two conclusions are available. The first conclusion, consistent with California Penal Code Section 2670 and the Kaimowitz decision,
is that because psychosurgery alters and interferes with mentation, the
regulation of the enforced use of psychosurgery upon an unconsenting
prisoner is within the ambit of the first amendment. 90 The second conclusion
is that to the extent that the alteration of mentation effected by
psychosurgery improves mentation, denial of access to the procedure would
91
also violate the prisoner's first amendment rights.
This second conclusion is dependent upon the proposition that the employment of psychosurgery may actually be of aid to the subject. The
Kaimowitz decision with its heavy emphasis upon the experimental nature
of psychosurgery, would seem to suggest the court did not accept this
proposition. 92 What the Kaimowitz court failed to fully consider is that
while psychosurgery may result in a dampening of mental functioning and
thereby severely limit the patient's mentative capacity, "this very dampening may also involve the elimination of dysfunctional responses to certain
stimuli, and thus might enlarge the set of opportunities for rational action." 93
87. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 256-57.

88. Shapiro, supra note 9 at 256-57. In accord with this proposition is CAL. PENAL CODE

§2670. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
89. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 256-57. Cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951)(a case

forbidding prior restraints of speech).

90. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 257.
91. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 257, 324-26. Similarly, in Aden the court states:

Freedom of thought is intimately touched upon by any regulation of procedures
affecting thought and feelings. In an effort to protect freedom of thought, the state
has put procedural and substantive obstacles in the path of those who both need and

desire certain forms of treatment, and in that way their freedom of thought remains

impaired because they cannot get treatment.
57 Cal. App. 3d at 680, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546.

92. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.
93. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 330-31.
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The proposition that psychosurgery may enhance mentative opportunity
by decreasing brain dysfunction finds support in Aden. The Aden court
recognized that regulation of access to psychosurgery may diminish the
patient's freedom of thought. 94 One interpretation of this statement is that
the patient's freedom of thought is diminished by denying him access to a
procedure that would reduce dysfunction. The Aden decision is instructive
here in that it recognizes that a denial of access to psychosurgery may be an

impermissible act by the state to the same extent that forcing such a
procedure upon an unwilling patient would be. 95 This is not to suggest that a
prisoner would have an unlimited right of access to psychosurgery. 96 The
suggestion, rather, is that in view of the possible enhancement of mentative

capacity resulting from the use of psychosurgery,
the state must demonstrate
97

some basis for a denial of access.
The contention that access to psychosurgery may be protected by the first

amendment guarantee of free speech has met with criticism. One source of
this criticism is the continued rejection of a right of access to mind altering
narcotics. 98 In Leary v. United States,99 the court held that a denial of

access to a mentation altering narcotic, marijuana, is not a violation of the
free exercise clause of the first amendment. Leary maintained that the
altered mentative state he achieved through the use of marijuana was
necessary for the practice of his religion and therefore governmental regulation of marijuana infringed upon his first amendment right to follow the
religion of his choice. 1 ° While the court rejected this contention, at least
two crucial factors distinguish access to marijuana from access to
psychosurgery. These factors are Leary's failure to demonstrate that mari94. See note 91 supra.
95. See 57 Cal. App. 3d at 680, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 547:
Some patients will be denied treatment as a natural and intended result of this
legislation. Although the reasons for such denials may be the patient's own best
interests, such regulation must be justified by a compelling state interest.
96. Id.
97. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature
absolute. "Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is
required in order to protect the State from destruction or from serious injury, political,
economic, or moral." Id. at 373.
The possibility that mentative capacity which affects only the person in question would be
beyond the control of the state can be drawn from Stanley v. Georgia, 395 U.S. 557, 565-66
(1969) wherein the Court states:
And yet, in the face of these traditional notions of individual liberty, Georgia asserts
the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. We are not
certain that this argument amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State
has the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts. To some, this may
be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First
Amendment.
A possible reading of Stanley would foreclose any first amendment regulation aimed solely at
the quality of mentation. Psychosurgery, however, would probably involve more than the
quality of mentation, and insofar as it involves questions beyond the quality of mentation,
regulation of psychosurgery would not be prohibited by Stanley.
98. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 327 n.310.
99. 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967).
100. Id. at 858.
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juana was necessary to the practice of his religion, Hinduism, 10 1 and, the
2
established legislative policy against marijuana. 1
In applying the Leary holding to the question of access to psychosurgery,
it is initially apparent that unlike marijuana there exists no established
legislative policy against the use of psychosurgery. The California statutes
that address the question of access to psychosurgery do so from the perspective of prohibiting its imposition upon an unconsenting patient or prisoner. 103 It has been suggested that the very presence of these statutes implies
acceptance of psychosurgery under other conditions. 10 4 Additionally, the
spurious nature of Leary's claim that marijuana is necessary to the practice
of Hinduism is more easily dismissed than the medical judgment of the
10 5
proponents of psychosurgery.
It is clear that both the courts and the California Legislature have recognized that mentation is protected by the first amendment. 10 6 Furthermore,
the fact that psychosurgery affects mentation has placed psychosurgery
within the ambit of the first amendment. 10 7 Though statutes and decisions to
date have declared only the use of psychosurgery on an unwilling subject to
be in violation of the first amendment, there is no apparent rationale for
rejecting the corollary that a denial of access to psychosurgery may also
violate the first amendment. The test employed in Penal Code Section 2670
by which the state must justify unconsented interference with mentation is a
showing of compelling interest in the interference. To the extent that
denying a prisoner access to psychosurgery interferes with mentation by
foreclosing the reduction of brain dysfunction, this denial of access must
also be justified by a-compelling state interest.
In response to a claim that the denial of access to psychosurgery violates
the right of expression protected by the first amendment, the most probable
basis for finding a compelling state interest in such denial would appear to
be that the procedure itself is unsound and more likely to dampen mentative
capacity than to enhance it. The court in Kaimowitz cites this as a factor in
its decision.108 The Kaimowitz holding is distinguishable from the question
of prisoner access to psychosurgery, due to the presence of an experimental
program that is not present in the situation where a prisoner requests access
101.

Id. at 860.

102. Id. at 861
103. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§2670-2680; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5325-5326.6.
104. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 325.
105. Cf. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720, 394 P.2d 813, 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73
(1964), a case in which peyote use was permitted where it was shown to be the cornerstone of a

legitimate religion, established prior to regulation of the procedure in question. This is distinguished from Leary in that marijuana use is not a cornerstone of Hinduism and Leary's attempt
to make it so occurred after legislation had established a policy prohibiting marijuana use.
106. See text accompanying notes 78-86 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
108. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.) at 36.
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to psychosurgery.1 09 Thus, Kaimowitz should be limited accordingly. 10
Additionally, one should bear in mind that California has no legislatively
declared policy against the use of psychosurgery. Prior legislation concerning psychosurgery addresses only the prisoners' unqualified right to refuse
psychosurgery and the conditions under which a mental patient would be
permitted to undergo psychosurgery. The fact that these statutes restrict the
use of psychosurgery only in limited circumstances demonstrates the legislature's tacit acceptance of psychosurgery in other circumstances. Where the
denial of access is based upon the shortcomings of the procedure itself, an
essentially medical judgment has been made. Psychosurgery remains, however, the subject of medical controversy. This controversy is properly one
for the legislature rather than the courts to resolve. The legislature, however, has through its silence tacitly condoned the use of psychosurgery. In
light of this silence, it seems doubtful that the state could establish a
sufficiently compelling state interest to deny a prisoner access to
psychosurgery.
MENTATION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

While the protectability of mentation may be derived from the first
amendment guarantee of free speech, mentation may also be protected by a
right of privacy. In Stanley v. Georgia,II' the Court stated that the Constitution confers upon the citizenry a fundamental right "to be free, except in
very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy."" ' 2 In making this statement the Stanley Court expressly
endorsed 1 3 the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United
States-,114 wherein it was stated that the Constitution protects citizens in their
thoughts, emotions and sensations by conferring upon them a right to be left

alone. 115
109. See text accompanying notes 153-155 infra, for a discussion of the special problems in
consenting to an experiment.
110. It should be noted that the Kaimowitz court was unwilling to distinguish between

procedures that are innovative and in that sense termed experimental, and those procedures
that are specifically part of an experimental program. The Kaimowitz court stated that:
The two issues framed for decision in this declaratory judgment action are as follows:
1.After failure of established therapies, may an adult or a legally appointed guardian
• ..give legally adequate consent to an innovative or experimental surgical procedure on the brain ....
Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.) at 8-9.
111. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
112. Id. at564.
113. Id.

114. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at478:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and

satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
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With regard to organic therapies, courts have also recognized the patient's
right to be let alone. One court stated that the use of aversive drug therapies,
where unconsented to, raises "serious constitutional questions respecting
.. . impermissible tinkering with the mental processes." 116 The
Kaimowitz court was more specific concerning what constitutional right it
felt such impermissible tinkering affected. The court stated that "there is no
privacy more deserving of protection than that of one's mind."117 Similarly,
the Aden court expressed its concern with 8protecting the patient from
unconsented to invasions of body and mind."1
In each of the above instances, the courts were concerned with preserving
the inviolability of the patient's mentation. Though the protection of mentation is closely related to the protection of speech, the protection afforded
mentation by a right of privacy is distinguishable from that afforded by the
first amendment's protection of speech in that privacy affects mentation
independent of any possibility of communication.1 19 Despite this distinguishing feature, the employment of a privacy argument of this type to
protect access to psychosurgery would employ essentially the same considerations as those used in a first amendment speech argument. 120
The right of privacy, however, is not limited to a right to be let alone. As
articulated in the leading case of Roe v. Wade,121 the right of privacy may
also afford access to the medical procedure of one's choosing. The respect
which is thereby given to one's autonomous choice to undergo a medical
procedure, particularly as this choice is manifest by informed consent, may
be crucial to a prisoner's right of access to psychosurgery.
In Roe, a right of privacy, derived from the fourteenth amendment, was
held to ensure the right of a woman to a non-therapeutic abortion in the first
trimester of her pregnancy. 122 With regard to the right of privacy, the Court
noted:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. 12
What is important here is that the Court sought to protect the woman's right
to make her decision free of unwarranted regulation. This interpretation is
consistent with the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Doe v. Bol116. Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.) at 38.
57 Cal. App. 3d at 678, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46.
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 274-75.
See text accompanying notes 78-110 supra.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id.

123. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
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ton, 12 4 Roe's companion case. Therein he stated that the essence of the right
of privacy as found in the fourteenth amendment is "the autonomous control
over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes and
personality."' 1 5
Though the Roe Court granted the right of privacy high regard, it further
noted that this right is not absolute and may be overcome by a showing of
compelling state interest. 126 The Court stated that the power of a woman to
terminate her pregnancy, while protected by the right of privacy, must be
considered against important state interests in regulation of abortion. The
state's interest in protecting the health of the mother was found insufficient
to obviate the mother's choice to have an abortion in the first trimester of her
pregnancy due to a medical determination that up until this point, the
possibility of mortality in abortion may be less than in childbirth. 127 The
Court rejected the contention that the state had a legitimate and compelling
interest in protecting the fetus in the absence of a prior legally recognized
concern for the fetus.128
In Aden, the court also addressed the question of whether denying a
patient access to a medical procedure which the patient had consented to
violated the patient's right of privacy. The court stated its adherence to the
Roe formulation of the right of privacy1 29 and declined to decide whether
the right of privacy included the selection of and consent to medical
procedures. 130 In a later portion of the opinion, however, the Aden court
stated that:
The state's interest in protecting patients from unconsented to and
unnecessary administrations of psychosurgery clearly justifies a
review procedure which insures the competency of the patient and
the truly voluntary nature of his consent. The incompetent patient
is incapable of consenting to such a procedure, and the state's
interest in protecting him from such procedure fully justifies the
3
attendant invasion of privacy.' '
The essence of this statement appears to be that any attempt by the state to
regulate the decision-making process is also an infringement upon the
privacy rights of the person whose decision is being reviewed. If the
patient's right of privacy is violated by state interference in the decision124. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
125. Id. at 211.
126. 410 U.S. at 154.

127. Id. at 163-64.
128. Id. at 161-62.

129. Id. at 154:
The privacy right, involved, therefore cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not
clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do
with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy
previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an
unlimited right of this kind in the past.
130. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
131.

Id. at 682, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
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making proceis, it would seem that what the right of privacy is protecting is
the decision-making process itself. Though the Aden court expressly stated
that they would not extend the right of privacy to include the decision to
undergo a medical procedure, it appears that in effect the court has done just
that.
Even if the contention that the Aden court has extended the right of
privacy to encompass the decision to undergo any medical procedure is not
accepted, the Aden court supplied an independent basis for placing the
decision to undergo psychosurgery within the ambit of the right to privacy.
The court stated that when the decision is whether to undergo a procedure
that is closely related to fundamental rights, that decision is necessarily
within the right to privacy.1 32 Based upon either line of reasoning, the court
concluded that regulation of a competent mental patient's decision to undergo psychosurgery must be justified by a compelling state interest. 133 This
conclusion is clearly contrary to that of the Solano County Superior Court
which sought to place the burden upon the prisoner to show he had a right of
access to the procedure. 134 Based upon the rationale of privacy cases such as
Roe and endorsed by the Aden court, the burden must be put upon the state
to demonstrate the constitutionality of any regulation it seeks to impose
upon the prisoner's choice to undergo psychosurgery.
When the right of privacy is derived from the fourteenth amendment as in
the Roe case, the focal point of the right becomes the preservation of
personal autonomy. It has been contended that the fourteenth amendment
infuses the entire Constitution with a presumption in favor of personal
autonomy and against substitution of judgment by the state. 135 With regard
to medical procedures, the manifestation of personal autonomy has traditionally been the patient's informed consent to the procedure.
At common law, the theory of informed consent is rooted in the notion of
volenti non fit injuria-toone who is willing, no harm is done.1 36 Providing
that no public policy has been contravened, courts leave the consenting
132. Id. at 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546:
While the decision to terminate a pregnancy is includable within those "fundamen-

tal" rights as an activity closely related to the above activities, we need not decide

whether the decision to undergo medical treatment is deserving of constitutional
protection in and of itself. . . because the right to privacy so clearly includes privacy

of the mind.
133. Id. at 682-84, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548-49.

134. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
135. Ratner, The Function Of The Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1070
(1968):
The Due Process and residual rights concepts connote a basic limitation upon govern-

mental authority, derived from the function of government and the official-citizen
relationship. They imply that government may restrict human activity only for a
socially useful purpose, that every government regulation should implement some

community value.
This limitation sustains individual autonomy in choice of goals. It preserves for
each person optimal freedom to determine his needs and the ways to fulfill them.
136. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 101 (4th ed. 1971).
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individual to determine his own destiny.' 37 Though informed consent was
originally utilized as a defense to certain intentional torts,138 its common
contemporary use is as a defense to medical malpractice. 139 Although
commonly used as a defense to medical malpractice, the true purpose of
informed consent is to underscore the role of the patient's autonomous
choice in electing to undergo a medical procedure. As stated by Justice
Cardozo, the requirement of informed consent means that "every human
being of adult years and sound mind, has a right to determine what shall be
done with his body." "0
The concept of informed consent honors the right of a person to determine
what he would have done to his body. In this sense, the giving of consent is
also a manifestation of the right to choose a medical procedure which Roe
held protected by a right of privacy. 141 While the Roe Court was careful to
note that the right to choose a medical procedure is not unlimited, it also
42
made clear that this choice is not one the state can easily ignore. 1
Though similarly limited, informed consent, as the manifestation of this
right of privacy, remains a powerful vehicle for expressing the individual's
autonomy which may not be easily overridden. In California decisions,
courts have held that after consent is given to a procedure, the physician has
not only a right, but also a duty, to provide treatment. 143 Case law further
maintains that even when such a procedure will incidentally affect the
fundamental rights of others, the consent of the patient alone is sufficient. 144
In general, informed consent represents an exercise of personal autonomy
45
and is initially sufficient to warrant the medical procedure in question. 1
In both the Kaimowitz and Aden decisions, it was successfully contended
that circumstances exist under which the judgment of the state may be used
as a substitute for, and in abridgment of, the consent of the prisoner or
patient.146 Prefacing the Kaimowitz analysis of what constitutes adequate
consent are suggestions as to the nature of informed consent. The court
states:
137. Id.
138.
139.
140.
(1914).
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972).
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosps., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 93
See text accompanying notes 125-131 supra.
410 U.S. at 154.
Rosenberg v. Feigin, 119 Cal. App. 2d 783, 786, 260 P.2d 143, 144 (1953).
Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 38, 224 P.2d 808, 811 (1950). The question

before the court was whether a physician must obtain the consent of the husband in addition to
that of the patient/wife before the wife could be sterilized. The court noted:
Although the appellants also assert that the consent of both husband and wife was
necessary, they cite no authority in support of such proposition. On the contrary, the

Id.

consent of the patient alone is sufficient.

145. While the patient's consent is sufficient to warrant the procedure, the fact that the

rendering of all medical services is subject to the sound discretion of the attending physician

should not be overlooked.
146. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra, for a discussion of the Kaimowitz decision;

text accompanying notes 62-73 supra, for a discussion of the Aden decision.

1978 / PrisonerAccess to Psychosurgery
Informed consent is a requirement of variable demands. Being
certain that a patient has consented adequately to an operation,
for example, is much more important when doctors are going to
undertake an experimental, dangerous, and intrusive procedure
than, for example, when they are going to remove an appendix.
When a procedure is experimental, dangerous and intrusive, special safeguards are necessary. The risk-benefit ratio must be carefully considered, and the question of consent thoroughly
explored.147

This statement is crucial in its implication that adequacy of consent is to be
tested against the gravity of the procedure to be employed. Accepting the
notion that consent is a requirement of variable demands, the court then
bases its analysis of the adequacy of consent on three factors. These factors
48
are competence, knowledge, and voluntariness.1
The Kaimowitz court's discussion of the first factor, competence, was
focused upon the effects of incarceration upon a prisoner. The court states
that the very fact of incarceration diminishes the capacity of the prisoner to
give adequate consent. 1 49 A finding of impaired competency to consent
based upon the very fact of incarceration appears to be at odds with statutes
recognizing the ability of the prisoner to give informed consent. 150 Due to
the clear conflict between these statutes that recognize competency to
consent despite confinement, and the contention of the Kaimowitz court that
confinement diminishes the capacity to consent, it appears that the
Kaimowitz holding lacks legal basis in this regard and should not be
followed.
In considering the second factor, voluntariness, the Kaimowitz court
again relies upon the fact of confinement. The court states that due to the
inequality of position between the confined and the confiners, the consent of
the confined cannot be voluntary.15 1 In Kaimowitz, the inequality of position is twofold. In one sense there is inequality merely because of the
prisoner's position as confined. This contention is not compelling because
as previously stated, statutes express that prisoners will not be held to lack
the capacity to consent merely because of confinement.1 52 A more convincing rationale in support of a lack of voluntariness in the Kaimowitz situation
147.
148.
Section
149.
150.

Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich) at 22.
Id. See note 41 supra for an exposition of informed consent found in Penal Code
2672(a).
Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.) at 25.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §2600 which implicitly recognizes the competency of a prisoner

to give informed consent in its statement that the prisoner loses only those rights that are
necessary for the security of the institution and the protection of the public. Penal Code Section
2670 expressly provides that certain medical procedures, including psychosurgery, may only be

employed upon a prisoner who has given informed consent. Penal Code Section 2672(b)
expressly states that even where a prisoner is diagnosed as mentally ill, he will not be presumed

incapable of giving informed consent.
151. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.) at 29-30.
152. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
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would be based upon the fact that the procedure is experimental. 153 Partici-

pation in an experimental program is often rewarded with attractive and
otherwise unattainable benefits. Insofar as these benefits are an inducement
for a prisoner to participate in the experiment, they may impair the voluntariness of consent. 5 4 As previously stated, such conclusion is not pertinent to
a situation such as Kemper's where the procedure in question is not part of
155
an experimental program.
Considering the final requisite to adequate informed consent, that it be
knowing, the Kaimowitz court maintained that the evidence surrounding
psychosurgery is so uncertain as to make knowing consent to the procedure
impossible. 156 This position appears untenable, however, as a misunderstanding of what must be known to consent. The fact that the result of a
procedure is uncertain seems of less importance than that the patient is
informed of and accepts the possibilities. 157 One commentator, citing
Kaimowitz as an example of overprotection, states that:
153. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.) at 1-7.
154. See Ratnoff & Smith, Human LaboratoryAnimals: Martyrs for Medicine, 36 FORDHAm L. REv. 673, 684 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ratnoff & Smith]; Note, Medical and
PsychologicalExperimentationon CaliforniaPrisoners,7 U. Cal. D. L. Rev. 351,363-66 (1974).
It has been noted that participation in an experiment by a prisoner can be induced by several
extraneous factors. First, the prisoner is paid for his participation in the experiment. Second,
participation in an experiment gives the prisoner opportunity to relate to individuals from
outside the prison community. In the same vein, participation may also place the prisoner in a
special project area that is more comfortable, has better food and allows the prisoner more than
the ordinary prison regimen. Third, the prisoner believes that his participation in the experiment
is viewed favorably by prison officials. Under these circumstances, the voluntariness of
consent to the experiment has been seriously questioned.
155. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra. See Ratnoff & Smith, supra note 154, at
676:
Obviously, some physicians must move away from the established drug or practice.
One physician had to be the first to undertake an organ transplant. In this regard, two
types of innovation must be distinguished-those experiments designed for the
treatment or cure of a particular person, who is the patient-subject of the experiment,
and those experiments designed to add to our understanding of normal and abnormal
functioning of the body, including the effects of drugs and various techniques. This
second type of research, in which the subject has ordinarily nothing to gain either
diagnostically or therapeutically, creates the principal problem and the one which
concerns us here.
This statement distinguishes between the use of a procedure that, though arguably therapeutic,
is so innovative as to be deemed experimental, and a procedure that is part of a program
designed only to add to the pool of knowledge. The latter situation appears more closely related
to Kaimowitz, while the former situation more closely resembles a prisoner who seeks access
to psychosurgery absent an experimental program. But see note 106, supra, in which the
Kaimowitz court makes clear that they intend their decision to encompass innovative
psychosurgery as well as psychosurgery within experimental programs.
156. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.) at 26-27.
157. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972).
The court held that consent to a medical procedure requires only a full disclosure of possibilities, risks and alternatives. See Ritts, A Physicians View of Informed Consent in Human
Experimentation, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 6-31, 632 (1968):
[I]t is submitted that "consent" or "informed consent" means the patient-subject
has agreed to-participate in a bio-medical experiment under the direction of a
physician responsible for his physical and mental health and that his agreement has
been given after he understands what procedures will be performed on him, the
possible risks and benefits as far as can be predicted on the basis of available
knowledge and that he is always privileged to withdraw from the study consonant
with his own safety.
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[Tihe patient should not be so protected by the requirement of
informed consent that even when he knows procedures will be
he is not allowed to participate in a
used and accepts them,
158
rehabilitative program.
In sum, the findings of the Kaimowitz court are rebuttable and probably
would not be followed by a California court in determining a prisoner's right
of access to psychosurgery.
The logic of the Aden decision seems to support the concept that informed consent entails varying demands. The Aden court's concurrence in the
variable demands concept is evidenced by the fact that while substantive
review of a voluntary and competent patient's decision to undergo
psychosurgery is upheld, a similar review of a decision to undergo electroshock therapy is deemed an unwarranted incursion upon the patient's
right to privacy. 159 It must be questioned whether the patient's consent to
psychosurgery is any less competent, knowing and voluntary than his
consent to electroshock therapy. The answer would seem to be that by
employing the concept of variable demands, the state does not seek to
determine the adequacy of consent, but rather seeks to prohibit the use of
certain disfavored procedures.
Support for this proposition is found in Kaimowftz where the court notes
that if the state of medical knowledge reaches a level at which
psychosurgery would no longer be considered experimental, consent to the
procedure by one involuntarily confined would be considered adequate. 160
Similarly, the Aden court found review of the decision to undergo electroshock treatment impermissible while upholding similar review of the
decision to undergo psychosurgery. This decision was based upon the
contention that electroshock treatment finds greater acceptance in medical
circles than does psychosurgery. 161 In both the Aden and Kaimowitz decisions, the courts have demonstrated that their concern lies less with the
adequacy of consent than with the court's view of the propriety of the
procedure in question. Thus, it seems that under the guise of variable
demands, the courts are attempting to prohibit the use of psychosurgery
within the institutional setting.
Since access to psychosurgery involves a fundamental right of privacy,
any regulation of access to psychosurgery would be justified only if the state
were able to demonstrate a compelling reason for the regulation of this
158. Allyon, BehaviorModificationin InstitutionalSettings, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 3, 12 (1975).
159. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 683-84, .129 Cal. Rptr. at 548-49. Compare 15 CAL. ADM. CODE
§3345(b) which would permit shock therapy under limited circumstances with 15 CAL. ADM.

CODE §3343 which would absolutely prohibit the use of psychosurgery within the Department of
Corrections.
160. See Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.) at 38.
161.

57 Cal. App. 3d at 6 3-84, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548-49. The court expressly endorses the

rationale regarding incapacity of one confined to consent to these procedures expressed in
Kaimowitz. Id. at 674, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43.
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particular procedure. 162 As previously discussed, informed consent as an
authorization for a medical procedure may be considered as a manifestation
of the type of privacy right upheld in Roe v. Wade. 163 In Roe, the burden is
put upon the state to demonstrate a compelling interest for any regulation
that would infringe upon this right of privacy. In light of the characterization
of psychosurgery as a hazardous and irreversible procedure by both the
Kaimowitz and Aden courts, it would seem that both courts would establish
the protection of the prisoner/patient as the compelling state interest served
by regulation of access to psychosurgery.
The state's claim that regulation of prisoner access to psychosurgery
serves a compelling state interest by protecting the prisoner from the hazardous and irreversible effects of psychosurgery is without merit. The fact that
the legislature has made no determination that psychosurgery is a dangerous
procedure which should not be used, is evidence that the state has no
articulated interest in regulating prisoner access to psychosurgery. The
Court in Roe used similar reasoning to refute a claim that regulation of
abortion served a compelling interest by protecting the unborn fetus. The
Court found that the absence of prior legislative concern for the well-being
of the fetus prevented the state from claiming a compelling state interest in
64
their protection. 1
The fact that the state seeks to regulate only the access of prisoners and
mental patients to psychosurgery, is evidence that the state has no compelling interest in regulation of the procedure. The state may assert, however,
that the very incident of confinement creates a compelling state interest
warranting regulation of access to psychosurgery by those confined. As will
be discussed, the contention that confinement itself creates a compelling
state interest for the regulation of access to psychosurgery, may be subject to
attack for its failure to provide equal protection.
EQUAL

PROTECTION

While both prisoners' and mental patients' rights of access to
psychosurgery have been virtually eliminated, 165 the right of the general
public to undergo such procedure remains unfettered. Because the regulation of access to psychosurgery has been limited to prisoners and mental
162. See text accompanying notes 111-134 supra.
163. See text accompanying notes 135-136 supra.

164. 410 U.S. at 155-63. The Court rejected the state's claim of a compelling state interest
served by regulation of abortion based upon saving the fetus. The Court held that since the state

had failed to demonstrate substantial interest in the fetus through prior statutes and regulations,
the instant claim could not be deemed compelling. Id. at 161-62:

In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any
theory that life as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to
the unborn. In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in

the whole sense.
165. See text accompanying notes 34-52 and 62-73 supra.
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patients, the possibility of an attack on these regulations based upon failure
to provide equal protection exists.
In Dunn v. Blumstein, 166 the United States Supreme Court outlined the
factors to be considered under a claim that a regulation fails to provide equal
protection of law. The Court required an examination of the character of the
classification in question, the individual interests affected and the government interests asserted. 67 The Court further noted that while various tests
have been used to determine whether the regulation in question violates the
equal protection clause, the test to be employed when fundamental rights are
at issue is the exacting scrutiny of compelling state interest. 168 The Court
also stated that any regulation of a fundamental right must be so narrowly
drawn as to comprise the least restrictive means of furthering this compelling state interest. 169 An examination of a potential violation of equal
protection by denying a prisoner access to psychosurgery must include a
determination of whether the rights affected by the regulation are fundamental. If the rights affected are fundamental, the burden is placed upon the state
to show, first, that the regulation serves a compelling state interest, and
second, that the regulation is the least onerous alternative to effectuate this

interest. 170
Fundamental rights are those rights that are explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. 171 This being the case, mentation, insofar as
it is protected by the first amendment, 172 is a fundamental right that would
call forth the stricter scrutiny of compelling state interest. Similarly, privacy
rights, whether considered as the right to be let alone or the right to
determine what becomes of one's body, have been considered fundamental
rights by the Court. 173 To the extent that psychosurgery affects fundamental
rights of privacy 7 4 and mentation,' 7 the regulation of access to
166. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).

167. Id. at 335.

168. Id.; see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

169. 405 U.S. at 343; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).

170. In equal protection cases a second means available to trigger the compelling state

interest test is the presence of a suspect class. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-

83, (1973); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28-29, (1973). As noted by
Justice Powell in San Antonio, the determination of whether the class is suspect is based upon:

[Whether] the class is . . . saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a

history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
411 U.S. at 28. While the class of prisoners would appear to bear many of the indicia of a
suspect class, the Court has never called prisoners a suspect class and generally appears
reluctant to categorize a class as suspect. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,686 (1973)
(the Court refused to term sexual classifications suspect).
171. 411 U.S. at 33.
172. See text accompanying notes 78-111 supra.
173. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152'(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-86 (1965).
174. See text accompanying notes 111-162 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 78-111 supra.
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psychosurgery must be subjected to judicial scrutiny under the compelling
state interest test. Such a finding would be in accord with the aforementioned declaration of policy found in Penal Code Section 2670 in which it is
stated that mentation is a fundamental right. 176 The statute further mandates
that in the limited situations in which the state may enforce interference with
a prisoner's mentation, the interference is only warranted when the state is
able to show a compelling interest that will be served by the interference and
1 77
no less onerous alternative.
As has been suggested in the analysis of the Aden and Kaimowitz
decisions, there is a question whether the regulation of access to
psychosurgery was conditioned upon the nature of the procedure or the
situation of those who sought the procedure. 178 It has been suggested that
regulations placed upon psychosurgery thus far have been predicated upon
the nature of psychosurgery as an experimental, hazardous and irreversible
medical procedure. 179 While it is accepted that medical procedures may be
regulated as safety and public welfare demand, 18 0 the question remains
whether the demands of safety and public welfare require any greater
regulation of prisoner or mental patient's access to psychosurgery than the
regulation placed upon the general-public.
In Aden, the court quickly disposed of a claim that regulation of the
decision of a competent and voluntary patient to undergo psychosurgery
violated equal protection. The court stated that it is within the power of the
legislature to make reasonable classifications of persons and activities provided such classification is not arbitrary and bears reasonable relationship to
a legitimate goal. 8 1 The court stated that because psychosurgery is a
hazardous procedure and mental patients are a class in need of special
protection, regulation of a mental patient's access to psychosurgery is a
proper exercise of the police power. 182
The disposition of the equal protection claim set forth in Aden is based
upon both the characterization of psychosurgery as an extremely dangerous
176. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670. See text accompanying notes 28-46, supra.
177. CAL. PENAL CODE §2670.
178. See text accompanying notes 156-160 supra.
179. Id.
180. See Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905), in which the Court states that a
citizen does not have the right to refuse to be vaccinated. The Court states:
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy of
his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government, especially
of any free government existing under a written constitution, to interfere with the
exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in every well ordered society charged
with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual with
respect of his liberty may at times, under pressure of great dangers, be subjected to
such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general
public may demand.

Id.
181. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542. There is some question as to the test
applied by the cdurt. It appears that the court failed to apply the stricter scrutiny of the
compelling state interest test, but rather relied upon a showing of legitimate interest and rational
basis. Id.
182. Id.
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procedure and the characterization of mental patients as a group in need of
special attention.1 83 The characterization of psychosurgery as a medical
procedure requiring greater regulation is beyond the scope of this comment.
A more germane point, however, is raised by the rationale set forth in Aden
concerning why the class in question was in need of special protection in the
decisionmaking process.
The court in Aden noted that while mental patients are presumed competent to consent by statute, 184 "it is common knowledge [that] mentally-ill
persons are more likely to lack the ability to understand the nature of a
medical procedure and appreciate its risks." 18 5 Further, the court questioned
the ability of one confined to give adequate consent due to the very fact of
confinement. 186 The court held that measures regulating the decisionmaking
process of a mental patient are consonant with the purposes of legislation
which are to insure that the patient desires the procedure in question and that
187
the procedure is necessary.
The Kaimowitz court also relied upon the contentions that those confined
are in need of special protection in the decisionmaking process and that
psychosurgery was a hazardous procedure requiring stringent regulation.
Kaimowitz, however, involved the use of psychosurgery upon prisoners in a
context which was primarily experimental rather than therapeutic. As previously noted, the presence of an experimental program brings forth problems
not otherwise encountered in ascertaining the adequacy of consent to a
medical procedure.18 8 The attractive and otherwise undttainable benefits that
accompany participation in an experiment may induce the prisoner or mental
patient to undergo a procedure despite that procedure's lack of therapeutic
value. Due to the presence of such irducements, it is granted that the
decision of a prisoner or a mental patient to participate in an experimental
program should be closely scrutinized. It is submitted, however, that when
inducements such as those found in an experimental program are not
present, the prisoner should be able to make a decision to undergo a given
medical procedure without state interference in the decision-making process.189 The Kaimowitz decision would then be properly limited to regulating
the decisionmaking process of the subclass of prisoners who desire to
participate in an extremely hazardous experimental program.
183. Id. It should be noted that both the characterization of psychosurgery as an extremely

hazardous procedure and the classification of mental patients as a group in need of special
protection appear necessary to the result reached in Aden. Without the former, no reason exists
to regulate psychosurgery to a greater degree than electroshock therapy. Without the latter, no
reason appears to limit the regulation of psychosurgery to a limited class.
184. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5331.
185. 57 Cal. App. 3d 674, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
188. See text accompanying notes 154-155, supra.
189. Id.
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In both the Kaimowitz and Aden decisions, the courts posited definite
reasons why the prisoner's and mental patient's access to psychosurgery
could be more strictly regulated than that of the general public. 190 While the
Kaimowitz court never addressed the issue of equal protection, 19 1 and the
Aden court erred in the test to be applied, 19 one may accept for the sake of
argument that the reasoning of both courts could have satisfied the compelling state interest test of equal protection. The question remains, however,
whether similar reasoning can be used to defeat an equal protection attack
based upon denial of a prisoner's request for access to psychosurgery.
The situation of a prisoner who, of his own initiative, seeks access to
psychosurgery apart from an experimental program is clearly distinguishable from the situation of a mental patient seeking similar treatment.
The common sense notion of the incapacity of a mental patient to give
adequate consent, while doing violence to the express wording of the
statutes, retains some ring of plausibility. 1 93 The prisoner, however, by
virtue of his competence to stand trial, has been found able to understand the
nature of the proceedings taken against him and to assist counsel in conducting a rational defense. 194 While it is not contended that the standard of
competency to stand trial is equivalent to the standard of competency to give
adequate consent, both types of competency require knowledge or understanding. At trial, the prisoner as defendant is presumed sane and bears the
burden of disproving knowledge and understanding of the nature and quality
of his acts. 195 It would appear, then, that the prisoner who fails to rebut the
presumption of his sanity at trial should enjoy no less a presumption of

sanity during his confinement.1 96 In particular, the presumption of a prison-

190. See text accompanying notes 154-162 supra.
191. Because the Kaimowitz court addressed the question of psychosurgery from the
perspective of the state attempting to impose psychosurgery upon one incapable of consenting,
the question of whether equal protection was violated never became an issue.

192. See note 181 supra.
193. See text accompanying notes 183-187 supra.
194. CAL. PENAL CODE §1367:

A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while he is mentally incompe-

tent. A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result
of mental disorder, he is unable to understand the nature of the proceedings taken
against him and to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.
195. See People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 816, 394 P.2d 959, 972, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 285
(1964); CALJIC §4.00, at 97 (3d ed. 1970):
Legal insanity, as the words are used in these instructions, means a diseased or
deranged condition of the mind which makes a person incapable of knowing or
understanding the nature and quality of his act, or makes a person incapable of
knowing or understanding that his act was wrong.
CAL. EvID. CODE §522: "The party claiming that any person, including himself, is or was insane
has the burden of proof on that issue."
196. This statement should be construed narrowly as finding a presumption of sanity for
the class of prisoners, which presumption may be rebutted by the state. Particularly as applied
to the competency of a prisoner to give informed consent to psychosurgery, sanity at time of
trial may not reflect later competency to give informed consent. For example, assume a
prisoner had been. convicted of a lesser offense than that charged because of his successful
contention that diminished capacity rendered him incapable of an element of the offense in
question. The successful defense of diminished capacity may be evidence of some degree of
mental illness and thereby warrant the finding of a common sense incompetency as found in
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er's sanity may be available to negate the application to prisoners of the type
of common sense presumption of incapacity found with regard to mental
patients in Aden. It is probable, therefore, that the finding of incompetency
put forth for the regulation of the mental patient's decisionmaking process
would not attach in the case of a prisoner.
The ability of a prisoner to initiate a medical procedure by exercise of his
informed consent is given specific recognition by an opinion of the California Attorney General. 197 This opinion upholds the right of a prisoner to a
voluntary, nontherapeutic sterilization. 198 The opinion maintains that to
authorize the procedure, the consent of the prisoner is, of itself, sufficient.
The opinion is noteworthy in its declaration that the right of a prisoner to
undergo a medical procedure to which he has consented is the same as that
of the public at large. 199
The common sense notion of the incapacity of a mental patient to
adequately consent to psychosurgery, upon which the Aden court based its
characterization of mental patients as a class in need of special protection in
the decisionmaking process, would not seem to attach to the prisoner. Since
this common sense approach is inapplicable to a prisoner, the state would
then have no basis for characterizing prisoners as a group in need of special
protection in the decisionmaking process. Further, since there is no special
need for regulation of the prisoner's decisionmaking process, the state has
no compelling interest in limiting regulation of access to psychosurgery to
prisoners while allowing the general public unfettered access to the procedure. In the absence of a compelling state interest served by such limitation,
the regulation would be in violation of equal protection.
Aden. See People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 685-86, 504 P.2d 1256, 1264-65, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792,

800-01 (1973).

A second possibility is that during the course of incarceration, a prisoner, fully competent

prior to incarceration, becomes mentally ill. See Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to
Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 784, 791 (1969).

An inference of a prisoner's competence may also be rebutted by confinement within

particular types of penal institutions. An example would be confinement in an institution such
as the California Medical Facility which houses Kemper. CAL. PENAL CODE §6102 states the

purpose of this institution is "segregation, confinement, treatment and care of males under the
custody of the Department of Corrections.

.

.who are either mentally ill, mentally defective,

or mentally abnormal."
It has been suggested, however, that confinement in an institution such as the Medical
Facility where an express statutory purpose is treatment may also give rise to a right to
treatment. Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used To "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?"

"Demolish?" Prisioners And Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 616, 647 (1972). Such a

statutory right to treatment has been upheld for mental patients, but the extent to whtch this

right to treatment permits a mental patient to dictate what procedures will be employed in his
treatment is as yet unknown. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
It should also be noted that for purposes of refusing to consent to organic therapy suggested
by the state, CAL. PENAL CODE §2672(b) states that incapacity will not be presumed based upon

a diagnosis of mental illness. It would seem a similar presumption should also attach in the case
of a prisoner seeking access to psychosurgery.
197. 53 Op.ATr'Y GEN. 298, 299 (1970).

198. Id.
199. Id.
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It may be contended, however, that denying a prisoner access to
psychosurgery can be justified as a legitimate result of his status as a
prisoner. California courts, while recognizing legitimate penal goals of
rehabilitation, isolation and deterrence, 20 0 also note that a prisoner does not
forfeit all rights upon entering prison, but only those rights that are necessary for prison security and public protection. 2°1 In addition, it has been
held that the state's repression of a prisoner's rights beyond the extent to
which these rights are regulated in regard to other citizens, must be in
2 °2
furtherance of a compelling state interest.
It is difficult to fathom how the denial of access to psychosurgery would
serve a legitimate penal goal. Similarly, it is difficult to comprehend how
denial of access to psychosurgery would aid prison security or enhance
public protection. Moreover, the fact that the prisoner's first amendment
and privacy- rights have been zealously protected 2 3 would militate against a
finding of compelling state interest in denying access to psychosurgery to a
prisoner as a result of his confinement.
Though the state has the power to regulate medical procedures as safety
and public welfare demand, when this regulation is applied to a limited
group, the state's action may be in violation of equal protection. To the
extent that prisoners alone are denied access to a procedure affecting
fundamental rights, psychosurgery, the state must demonstrate that limiting
denial of access to prisoners alone is in furtherance of a compelling state
interest. In Aden, the court found mental patients to be a group in need of
special protection based on a common sense notion of their incapacity to
adequately consent. The prisoner, however, should not be subject to such
common sense notion of incapacity. The expression of statutes, bolstered by
the opinion of the Attorney General, is that prisoners are capable of giving
informed consent to a medical procedure. A finding that the prisoner was
competent to stand trial would also tend to uphold the existence of his
capacity to give adequate consent. Absent a showing that the prisoner is in
need of special protection, the state would not be able to demonstrate a
compelling interest in limiting the denial of access to psychosurgery to
prisoners while allowing the general public unfettered access. The inability
of the state to demonstrate a compelling interest that would be served by
limiting the denial of access to prisoners would necessitate invalidating any
such regulation as a violation of equal protection.
200.
201.
202.
203.

In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 924, 519 P.2d 1073, 1086, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 663 (1974).
CAL. PENAL CODE §§2600, 2601.
See Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971).
See CAL. PENAL CODE §2601 which specifically permits correspondence and access to

media; CAL. PENAL CODE §2670 which protects prisoners from enforced interferences with
mentation. The courts have similarly protected prisoners rights, e.g., Brown v. Peyton 437 F.2d
1228 (4th Cir. 1971); Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
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CONCLUSION
The subject of prisoner access to psychosurgery has received little judicial
or legislative attention to date. In the past, the concern of courts and
legislatures with regard to psychosurgery was to protect unconsenting prisoners from having the procedure imposed upon them. When a prisoner
voluntarily seeks access to psychosurgery, however, a different set of
problems arise.
Initially, it is apparent that psychosurgery, by its very nature, affects
mentation. To the extent that mentation is protected by either the right of
privacy, or by the first amendment guarantee of free speech, a denial of
access to a procedure that may improve mentation would violate these
constitutionally protected rights. Though psychosurgery is concededly an
innovative procedure, the effects of which are not yet fully understood, the
absence of an articulated legislative policy deeming the procedure harmful
would prevent the state from claiming a compelling interest in regulating
access to the procedure based on the possibility of adverse effects. Similarly, the right of privacy has been found to protect the individual's autonomous choice to undergo a procedure that affects fundamental rights. In order
for the state to justify a regulation of the choice to undergo this procedure,
the state must again demonstrate that such regulation serves a compelling
state interest. As has been seen, however, the absence of an articulated
legislative policy finding psychosurgery harmful prevents the state from
claiming a compelling interest in denial of access based upon the nature of
the procedure. In limiting the denial of access to psychosurgery to the class
of prisoners, a second problem arises. The inability of the state to demonstrate why the class of prisoners is in need of special protection with regard
to the decision to undergo psychosurgery causes the regulation to deny the
prisoner equal protection. In sum, denying a prisoner access to
psychosurgery, in the absence of a legislative policy warranting general
prohibition of the procedure, would violate first amendment and privacy
rights of the prisoner. To the extent that this denial of access is limited to the
class of prisoners without a demonstration of a compelling state interest in
affording this class special protection, equal protection is also violated.
As a final note, it should be emphasized that the purpose of this comment
is neither to compel the state to allow psychosurgery nor to endorse the use
of psychosurgery. The state has seen fit to allow psychosurgery to be
performed without regulation among the general public. By allowing this
procedure to continue 'without regulating its general use, the state has
condoned it. In effect, the absence of legislation demonstrates the People's
belief that the effects of psychosurgery may be beneficial. The state may
balance the risk-benefit ratio of psychosurgery and outlaw the procedure
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entirely-an action that may be fitting. So long as the legislature elects not
to regulate general access to the procedure, however, it should not regulate
the procedure solely as applies to prisoners, as such regulation violates the
prisoners' right to equal protection.
Paul Michael Kelley

